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ABSTRACT  
Prevailing project procurement processes and strategies are thought to be the root cause for 
many of the reported criticisms of the construction industry, such as lack of trust and 
collaboration and short term adversarial and transactional relationships. However, very few 
studies have sought to examine the relationship between the organisational, commercial 
and institutional environments influencing construction procurement and the generation of 
process waste in construction projects. This study addresses this gap in knowledge by 
providing findings from a case study of a major UK infrastructure project.  
The study identifies a number of prevailing, yet counterproductive, procurement and 
contractual governance practices that lead to a ‘network of causal wastes’. The study 
provides a conceptual model which exposes the complex, dynamic, interconnectedness and 
reciprocal nature of waste at the procurement and supply-chain level. The authors believe 
that this is the first study to expose the nature of waste at this level of analysis. It uses an 
integrated grounded theory case-study methodology that is demonstrably effective and can 
be useful for supporting studies seeking to investigate the concept of waste within the 
construction procurement context. The study concludes by suggesting that future studies 
focus on pre-procurement processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The construction industry is often criticised for being confrontational, lacking trust and 
capacity for learning and improvement, and for being wasteful compared to other industries 
(see for example, Koskela, 2000; Sarhan et al., 2018). Numerous industry reports have 
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been commissioned by the United Kingdom (UK) Government and industry organisations, 
over the past eighty years, with the aim of highlighting concerns and calling for industry 
reform (for example see Bossom, 1934; Simon, 1944; Banwell, 1964; Latham, 1994; Egan, 
1998; Wolstenholme et al., 2009; Farmer 2016; Construction Leadership Council, 2018). 
In 2013, the UK Government challenged construction to achieve 50% faster delivery and 
a 33% reduction of clients' capital costs by 2025 (HM Government, 2013). Similarly, in 
2016, the Government Construction Strategy 2016-20 was produced with an ambition of 
achieving efficiency savings of £1.7 billion over the course of the current Parliament 
(Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016). All these reports call for productivity 
improvements and a shift away from traditional short-term, adversarial, and transactional 
procurement and business models. 
In October 2016, Farmer’s report highlighted various inefficiencies within the UK 
construction sector, including its lack of innovation and collaboration. The report urged the 
need for the introduction of new business models that align with innovative production 
delivery approaches (e.g. offsite construction). Of interest, the report collected evidences 
that many innovative approaches to construction design and construction processes stall or 
get immediately refused, due to negative and deeply-rooted perceptions of risk in the 
industry. According to the report, these perceptions often stem from the commissioning 
clients and their advisers, architects, building control inspectors, the wider supply chain, 
and ultimately, insurers and funders (p. 35). This assertion aligns with a previous warning 
provided by Paul Morrell, the former Chief Construction Officer, who argued that the 
standing and perceived value of the various professions involved in the construction 
industry is challenged, “with detractors seeing in their conduct and practice a tendency 
towards protectionism, resistance to change, the reinforcement of silos and the preservation 
of hierarchies” (Morrell, 2015, p. 5). It is also consistent with work of Sarhan et al. (2017) 
who explained how and why inefficient construction-procurement safeguarding 
arrangements prevail in the industry, due to institutional pressure exerted on clients from 
third parties (e.g. consultants, quantity surveyors, lawyers, insurance companies and banks). 
These professionals do not “take a central stake in the project outcome, only a stake in the 
process by which the project is delivered” (p. 570). 
The prevailing project procurement processes are thought to be a root cause for many, 
if not all, of these aforementioned issues and problems (Latham, 1994; Osipova and 
Eriksson, 2011; Sarhan et al., 2018). A small but growing number of studies have 
attempted to investigate the influence of procurement processes on the generation of waste 
in construction projects (for example see Jaques, 2000; Gamage et al., 2009). However, 
most of these studies, if not all, have limited their attention to physical (material) waste; 
other important considerations such as process waste and value-creation or loss in relation 
to project procurement have been hardly explored. Work by Sarhan et al. (2018) introduced 
the concept of ‘institutional waste’ within the construction procurement context, stressing 
the importance of investigating the institutional factors influencing procurement, and how 
these contribute to the generation and persistence of process waste in construction projects. 
The authors are unaware of any empirical studies that examine the relationship between 
institutions, project procurement and process waste in construction. The purpose of this 
study is to explore this apparent gap in knowledge through an integration of both 
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interpretative case-study and grounded-theory methodologies. In general, both terms 
`procurement system’ and ‘contractual arrangement’ are closely related and are often used 
synonymously (Love et al., 1998). For convenience, this study focusses on ‘construction 
project procurement and governance arrangements’, as defined and conceptualised in work 
by Sarhan et al. (2018, pp. 7-11). In the next section, the research methodology adopted 
for the study will be explained. Following this an analysis and discussion of emerging 
findings will be presented, and finally the conclusion and recommendations for clients and 
decision-makers will be provided. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The main aim of this study is to contribute to the concept of waste as understood in 
construction by exploring the prevailing construction procurement and commercial 
contexts that surround the design and delivery of construction projects. The methodology 
for such a study should enable to a holistic explanation of the underlying motives and 
behaviours associated with the use of wasteful construction procurement and commercial 
arrangements. 
‘Accurate shared-learning’ is rarely obtainable in relation to commercial issues. People 
will generally share good news but not necessarily the bad, and the links between cause-
and-effect in the case of both are rarely accurately assigned. Thus, it was decided that an 
interpretative research approach is necessary for the study. These considerations along-side 
both the exploratory and explanatory natures of the study pointed the authors towards 
qualitative methods and a choice between the use of grounded-theory or multiple case 
studies, or an integrated approach. 
A case study route (Yin, 1994) could be appropriate for identifying cause-and-effect 
relationships within a specific context, but it would confine the study to a limited number 
of projects agreed upon at the outset by either clients or main contractors. Also, it can be 
extremely difficult for researchers to gain access to contractual information in live projects, 
for reasons of commercial sensitivity. Even, if access was possible, it can be notoriously 
difficult to determine truth from commercial studies, especially if attempted through direct 
observation of live procurement processes. People tend to be sensitive about the issues they 
disclose and the implications for their immediate or future commercial positions.  
A grounded theory (GT) approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) can help to overcome 
many of these methodological challenges by allowing the coverage of a wider variety of 
cases, while at same time putting participants on ease and ensuring that they remain 
anonymous. It is important to stress that in GT, the unit of analysis is not the individuals 
themselves, but actual incidents reported or observed in the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
In addition, GT is of particular value when the research challenge is to interpret complex 
social processes where holistic explanations are lacking (Hinton and Hamilton, 2015). 
Furthermore, the inductive focus of GT makes it suitable for exploring a topic of interest 
or a substantive problem area that little is known about (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As 
incidents used for data analysis will come from disparate projects and contexts, it may be 
difficult to accurately detail cause-and-effect relationships. A GT approach would lead to 
the development of ‘abstract’ conceptual model or theories.  
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For these reasons it was decided to use a Straussian GT approach in conjunction with 
case study research, under interpretivist epistemological assumptions, as an integrated 
methodology. In simple terms, the study used a deductive-inductive GT methodology using 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) rigorous coding procedures to analyse data collected from a 
case-study. Similar research approaches for integrating GT and case-study have been used 
in the fields of information technology and systems (for e.g. see Halaweh et al., 2008 and 
Halaweh, 2012).  Few, if any, studies have adopted this integrated approach for conducting 
empirical construction management research.  
EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY  
This paper presents findings from an investigation into a major UK public-sector 
infrastructure project, worth around £174 million. This case-study was explored in 2015-
16, while the first author was conducting a wider-study (Sarhan, 2018) “seeking evidence 
for practical examples of waste or value-loss arising from construction procurement and 
commercial practices”. The project-team involved in the afore-mentioned infrastructure 
project found the research topic of relevance and significance to their needs. They were 
willing to collaborate and engage in a shared-learning exercise, in order to identify the root-
causes of the problems they generally experience in UK public-sector construction projects. 
This openness and desire to ‘learn as a team’ has helped the study to overcome the 
methodological challenges previously explained. All participants were assured that all 
identities and collected information will remain anonymous and be treated confidentially. 
In this paper, a gender-neutral language will be used when referring to participants. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
This study relied on the use of qualitative semi-structured interviews, as part of an 
integrated grounded theory case study methodology. All interviews were conducted over 
the telephone rather than face-to-face. Telephone was more time and cost effective, but 
also, when the interviewer is not physically present it can help interviewees to feel less 
threatened or distressed when answering sensitive questions (Bryman, 2012, p. 488). The 
first interview was conducted with a representative of the Main Contactor in Nov 2015 
when the project had been running for just over a year. The aim of this study was to ask 
about the typical problems experienced in their current project. The terms ‘problem’ or 
‘examples of value-loss’ were both used instead of ‘waste’, based on feed-back obtained 
from industry practitioners during pilot studies of a semi-structured interview guide 
prepared for this study.  
After initial data collection and analysis of this interview was completed, the study 
employed theoretical sampling to determine who to sample next and what questions to ask 
during interviews, until theoretical saturation was achieved. Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 
45) define theoretical sampling as a “process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to 
collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges”. Table 1 
provides an overview of the sample characteristics of this study. So, data was not collected 
from a pre-determined sample; instead it was subject to an evolving and iterative processes 
and controlled by theoretical categories emerging from analysis of data already collected. 
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The participants were also asked to provide supporting evidence whenever possible. 
Examples of supporting documents received and analysed in this study include: 
• Form of agreement and contract data (268 pages) 
• Samples of planning sheets related to resource quantities and scheduling 
• Samples of weekly work plans and consolidated as-built Percentage Plan 
• Charts and diagrams of Percentage of Plans Completed (PPC), including analysis of 
reasons for noncompletion (RNC). 
• Template of tool-kit used for measuring supply-chain performance 
Table 1: Sample information (in non-corresponding order) 
Professional Role / Title Organisation 
Duration 
(mins) 
Data 
Collection* 
Senior Design Coordinator 
Main Contractor 
45 P+D 
Senior QS  39 P 
Site Agent (CEng) 40 P+F+D 
Sub-Agent 
27 (S+E+D) 
Project Planner 
Director and Project Manager Specialist Subcontractor  33 P 
Principal Design Engineer Designer 40 P 
ECC Project Manager (CEng, MICE) 
Employed by the Client 
36 P 
Deputy Project Manager (CEng, MICE) 33 P+E 
Senior Consultant 
Financial Governance 
Consultancy 
35 P+D 
* S= skype, P= phone, E= follow-up questions by e-mail, F= follow-up by phone, D= supporting docs sent 
CONTRACTUAL AND COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The main documents forming the contract between the owner and the main contractor were 
as follows: 
• A Form of Agreement duly executed by the Parties as a deed; 
• The Framework Contract; 
• Option Z - the additional conditions of contract (Z-clauses) contained in the Contract, 
which include amendments to core, main and secondary option clauses; 
• The NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract June 2005 (with amendments June 
2006 and September 2011) (as amended); 
o Main Option C - Target Contract with Activity Schedule. (as amended); 
o Option W2 – Dispute Resolution (as amended); 
o Secondary Option X2 - Changes in the law (as amended); 
o Secondary Option X5 – Sectional Completion (as amended); 
o Secondary Option X7 – Delay Damages (as amended); 
o Secondary Option Y(UK)2 – HGCR Act 1996 (as amended) 
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• The Works Information; 
• The Site Information; 
• The activity schedule; and 
• The Prices (including any Resource Schedules and the Lump Sum Fee). 
MAIN PROBLEMS REPORTED IN THE CASE-STUDY   
THE LARGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (RFI) BEING RAISED 
One of the main problems found in this project was the large number of technical queries 
(Also known as: RFI) that were being raised by the contractor.  The Site Agent reported 
“883 RFI have been raised to date. Majority of these have been raised for design 
clarification where either insufficient information has been provided or the current design 
is not very clear”. When the designer was asked about how they were affected by the large 
number of RFIs raised in such a short period of time, the participant said:  
“If there are a lot of RFIs being raised and we don't believe they were all warranted, 
and believe that the contractor should be able to adapt to the design and does not need 
the level of details which they are requiring. We’ll then make a case to the client and 
ask for additional resources…you'll be looking at any compensation events, so we can 
increase what could have been our original target cost or give us another additional 
sum of money to recover the additional work undertaken in responding to the RFIs”.  
A recent study, based on data collected from 168 projects, found, that the average cost 
of processing RFI on a project in Australia and New Zealand is around US$656 and 
US$243 respectively (Aibinu et al., 2018).  
CLIENT VARIATIONS AND CHANGE ORDERS 
The whole supply-chain suffered from receiving numerous Project Management 
Instructions during early stages of the project (Also known as: Client Variations or Change 
Orders). Examples of responses received concerning this problem include: 
• Project Manager: “We are subject to quiet a lot of change post contract and that's not 
ideal for an NEC type contract”. 
• Design Coordinator: “Well, so far we are probably just over a year into the contract 
now, so we've had over 350 project management instructions. And we've had 150 odd 
supervisors' instructions. So, that's five-hundred instructions that we've had on this 
scheme since we've started… So those instructions all have to be evaluated and 
obviously tie the QSs up”. 
• Specialist Subcontractor: “Contractors’ and clients' change orders cause us lots of risk 
and pressure due to our commitments and plans of delivery with our manufacturers - 
we need at least 3 months of notice prior to delivery”. 
• Financial Consultant: “One of the problems on this particular job was that the client 
was eager to let it before the old framework expired. And consequently, it was you might 
say less well defined at the time it was let than it ought to be, and that resulted in an 
awful lot of change in the early days…We have on this particular scheme successfully 
obtained compensation events for increased resources as a result of the sheer volume 
of change”. 
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When the researcher asked the Deputy Project Manager about the reasons for the huge 
amounts of change orders, the participant simply said: “They [the contractors] are having 
a lot of change in the scope of the works...Why?! Hmm, well, it's due to the client really!”. 
The researcher then referred to the contractor once again and asked the Site Agent for 
explanations; the participant said:  
“To start off, the project has been live for nearly a year now. And it has been a very 
slow process of getting responses back for RFIs. And this has been highlighted to the 
client in our meetings with the client, and with the designer: ‘You know your response 
time to our RFIs is very slow.’ And they will say that we don't have the resources. And 
one said, they were accusing us of raising too many RFIs. And we conquered that 
argument saying: 'well the reason we are raising so many RFIs is because the design 
is not clear'. So, which has a sort of indirect impact on the number of PMIs getting 
raised”.  
Further investigation revealed that there were commercial misalignments, onerous 
contractual clauses and other procurement processes, which contributed to the generation 
of these wasteful behaviours, conflicts and arguments.  
SUB-OPTIMISATION AND COMMERCIAL MISALIGNMENTS 
The client used procurement mechanisms which focused on optimising the target fees of 
each main project party (e.g. Main Contractor and Designer), while overlooking how this 
may influence overall project performance and target cost. This led to self-interest as the 
main contractor and designer found no incentive to collaborate together to reduce overall 
project costs; instead each party focused on finding ways to reduce their own costs, even 
if this came at the expense of overall project performance. Of interest, the Deputy Project 
Manager was not aware himself or herself of how this commercial misalignment might 
impact on project performance. For instance, the participant said:  
“I see, yes, but everyone is not affecting the other. Like they both have, hmm, the target 
cost. Hmm, there is one target cost for the whole project, then within this overall target 
cost, we have separate items for the contractor’s cost, and separate items for the 
designers and the QSs and others – these are part of the auxiliary costs. So, although 
the total target cost will be increased by each party, but they both have to manage their 
own. So, really at the end, each one is not affecting the other”  
Further, the client had a predetermined choice and preferred the use of a ‘collaborative’ 
form of contract (NEC option D – Target Cost Contract with Activity Schedule) regardless 
of the procurement approach adopted for the project. This has been described by the 
Financial Governance Consultant as follows: 
“The principle with the Client’s Schemes was that the designs are relatively generic. 
So, the client keeps that design in-house. Unfortunately, it then uses a form of contract 
which pre-supposes, you know the NEC, that it's a contractor design. So, it's an uneasy 
alliance there which leads to a lot of variations”. 
EXCESSIVE NON-VALUE ADDING REPORTING AND CONTRACT ADMIN WORK 
The project participants raised concerns about the excessive and, in some cases duplicated, 
reports required by the client from the supply-chain for monitoring and measuring the 
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accuracy of monthly financial projections on spend. These prevailing non-value-adding 
performance monitoring and reporting arrangements contribute to the generation and 
entrenchment of process waste in construction projects. Obviously, they led to an 
unnecessary increase in client’s transactional costs. They also led to an adversarial 
environment which can lead to feelings of mistrust that, in turn, hinder collaboration and 
encourage opportunistic behaviours. Interestingly, these inefficient cost control practices 
also led to hidden costs that the client may not be aware of as highlighted by the 
Contractor’s Quantity Surveyor: 
“We have a Commercial Manager who deals with the reporting of this project. And we 
all feed him our information into him. He has to collate it and prepare it into several 
different formats basically for the client's requirements. So, it is excessive. It does take 
a long time and it is not necessarily a value to the client to have all this information, 
because we are paying for this person to provide all this work...It's just not efficient…it 
is a waste! So, reports that are duplicated is the answer”.  
It can be argued that these inefficient practices are more likely to exist in a contract 
exercise that tries to compensate for failing to spend enough time creating certainty before 
procuring a contract. Further, these excessive non-value-adding reporting and admin 
requirements lead to waste of human potential and value-loss. For example, the QSs spent 
most of their time in this project evaluating client’s change orders, collecting information 
required for reports, administering subcontracts, early warning notices and requests for 
compensation, rather than finding means for maximising value delivery.  Similarly, the 
NEC Project manager's effort was mainly focused on administering the contract rather than 
managing production flow. The whole supply-chain, in general, spent considerable time 
and resources providing evidence for claims and compensation events, in comparison to 
what they spent on managing production. 
INEFFICIENT SAFEGUARDING AND ONEROUS CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT 
The project contract included a Z-clause that implies that if a fatality occurred on the site 
of the scheme, the contractor loses his share in any savings gained for delivering the project 
below the target cost. As a fatality occurred during the beginning of the project, the 
contractor lost commercial incentive to collaborate with others to beat the scheme’s target 
price. The commercial misalignments mentioned above made the problem worse. 
‘If the Scheme Outturn Cost is greater than the Scheme Target Price, the Contractor 
pays his share of the excess. If the Scheme Outturn Cost is less than the Scheme Target 
Price, two-thirds of the Contractor’s share of the saving is retained and contributed to 
the Programme Level Incentive Fund and the remaining one third (the “remaining 
Contractor’s share”) is paid to the Contractor, provided that the remaining Contractor’s 
share is paid to the Employer if there is a fatality on the site of the Scheme as a result of 
a reportable incident, is paid to the Employer in the event of termination for any of 
reasons R1-R15 or R18 and is reduced for late Completion in accordance with the table 
below’ (Z-Clause, NEC3, 2016). 
Additionally, during the review of the contract documents, the following disclaimer 
clause was found. These disclaimer clauses, which unfairly push risks to others, have been 
reported by various studies (e.g. see Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Sarhan et al., 2017) as 
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a major reason for increasing the total cost of a project - in the form of insurance or 
contingencies, adversarial relationships and potential claims and disputes.  
‘The Contractor’s total liability to the Employer for all matters arising under or in 
connection with this contract is unlimited’ (Disclaimer Clause, NEC3, 2016). 
PREVAILING INEFFICIENT PROCUREMENT PRACTICES 
The inductive bottom-up coding and analytical procedures adapted in this study led to the 
conceptualisation of various inefficient procurement practices (Figure 1), which, evidence 
from the data has shown, contributed to the generation of wasteful behaviours, 
performances and outcomes in the project. 
 
Figure 1: Coding structure for ‘inefficient procurement practices and arrangements’ 
It was found in the study that these prevailing procurement arrangements have a 
negative influence on the way that project-parties behave and perform throughout the 
project, leading to consequential wastes. The following section illustrates the impact of 
these inefficient procurement practices on project team performance and behaviour and 
reveals the nature of waste that exists at the procurement and supply-chain levels of 
analysis. 
THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC NATURE OF WASTE AT THE 
PROCUREMENT LEVEL 
Construction processes are non-linear, interrelated and take place within a dynamic 
environment that includes lots of variables. Thus, relationships between different kinds of 
waste are very complex (Formoso et al., 2015). Figure 2 shows the interconnectedness and 
dependencies between different causes of waste, which result from the prevailing 
procurement practices and mindsets (Figure 1). This diagram was developed using NVivo 
matrix-coding query (in association with a careful data-verification of the resulting patterns) 
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and sketched using Insights Maker (a web-based modelling tool) to reveal the complexity 
and interactive nature of waste existing at the procurement and supply-chain level. It was 
also found that this dynamic ‘causal network of wastes’ (Figure 2) leads to consequential 
wastes (at the production level), which are conceptualised in this study into four main 
categories: (1) financial losses and cost overruns; (2) time waste; (3) quality or value loss 
in design, and (4) waste of human potential. 
 
Figure 2: The nature of waste at the procurement / supply-chain level 
This phenomenon is relatively similar to what Koskela et al. (2013) referred to as a 
‘chain of wastes’, with one waste acting as a ‘core’ or ‘lead’ waste. In their study they 
argued, ‘Making-do’, in particular, is a core waste in construction (at the production-level 
of analysis) with substantial negative impact on the production system. Subsequently, 
Formoso et al. (2015) suggested that by attacking this core, one can also eliminate the 
wastes caused by it. According to them, the causal connections between wastes are not 
necessarily uni-directional; they can also be reciprocal (A leads to B while at the same time 
B leads to A). Thus, devising operational strategies focusing on the reduction of the effects 
would still be useful, as it can help to generate a root-cause analysis leading to the core 
wastes in the system (for example, this could be achieved using Last Planner System for 
production control). They concluded their study by offering a preliminary causal analysis 
of waste generated on site, with a focus on the production (design and construction) stage. 
They reflected on their reasoning approach, as follows: 
“Our line of reasoning has taken us from the conceptualization of a linear chain with 
clear causes and effects to a complex network with both uni-directional and interactive 
connections between the nodes. In such a complex network we may not be able to 
identify and analyse all the connections. We see a pattern, but are not able to 
decompose or decode the network in all its components and interconnections” 
(Formoso et al., 2015, p. 457) 
The conceptual model of waste developed in this study (Figure 2) is relatively 
consistent with the conceptualisations offered by Koskela et al. (2013) and Formoso et al. 
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(2015). However, this study adds to their work by offering different perspectives and 
explanations; hence this study is based on a different level of analysis (i.e. procurement 
and supply-chain level) and is approached using a reflexive grounded-theory methodology. 
In line with their arguments, it makes sense to propose that if clients stopped adhering to 
prevailing inefficient procurement practices, they could eliminate or reduce the substantial 
negative impacts of these procurement arrangements on the production system; thereby 
enhancing process-flow, eliminating or reducing the consequential wastes and minimising 
total project costs (both transactional & production). That said, it is arguably more crucial 
to address the institutional factors and underlying fundamental paradigms which influence 
construction procurement choices and lead to the persistence of waste in construction. In 
other words, it would be unwise to tackle procurement processes alone, without first 
investigating the institutional factors and underlying paradigms that influence early-project 
decisions and condition project procurement & governance strategies (Sarhan et al., 2018). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The nature of waste within the construction procurement context is complex, dynamic, 
interrelated and reciprocal. This study has shown how prevailing procurement practices 
can lead to a complex ‘causal network of wastes’ at the procurement/supply-chain level, 
leading to the generation of consequential wastes.  
This study has identified various prevailing project procurement practices, which are 
taken-for-granted yet impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. The 
study also revealed some of the unnecessary waste that clients and decision-makers embed 
into their projects by adhering to counterproductive contractual governance arrangements.  
The findings of this study suggest that much of the waste generated in construction 
projects stems from prevailing project procurement practices and governance arrangements. 
These construction procurement practices are shaped by institutional structures, beliefs and 
attitudes as well as project characteristics (Sarhan et al., 2016, 2017, 2018). For this reason, 
it has been stressed in this study that tackling inefficient procurement processes, without 
examining the wider institutional forces and underlying paradigms influencing 
procurement choices, may lead to some productivity improvements but won’t address the 
root-cause(s) of the problem. The prevailing procurement system is not necessary the 
villain; it is only a malformed messenger of an inevitable outcome due to poor pre-
procurement processes. Future studies are therefore recommended to investigate the 
institutional factors influencing buyers’ approaches to construction project procurement. 
The methodology used in this study can be useful for future studies seeking to 
understand and identify the causes and effects of process waste within construction 
procurement and supply-chains. The original and empirical findings that emerged from this 
study provide some evidence of the effectiveness of the methodology. 
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